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Address the Impacts of Globalization on
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ABSTRACT
This Note addresses the management of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage (UCH) in the Dominican Republic as a case study of the effects
of two aspects of globalization on cultural and environmental resource
management in the developing world: the international convergence of
values and the horizontal delegation of state power to private actors due
to economic constraints. This Note posits that even as the global
community of states moves toward a consensus on the ethical
management of the UCH, this convergence combined with the global
trend of horizontal delegation may incentivize some lesser-developed
countries to deal with the economic pressures of resource management by
permitting treasure hunting. To examine this phenomenon, this Note
addresses national and international laws protecting the UCH,
including Dominican laws and their actual consistency with the 2001
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage. It then discusses how management in the Dominican Republic
is not always in accord with either the country's own laws or the 2001
Convention to illustrate both the impacts of globalization- on
management of the UCH when government resources are scarce, and the
resulting need for an extralegal, community-based solution. This Note
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concludes with a suggestion that the Dominican government, Dominican
communities, and international actors consider a variant of Common-
Pool Resource Management known as Living Museums in the Sea
incorporated into a Multilevel Environmental Governance framework as
a potential solution to counteract the economic pressures on governments
to allow treasure hunting while providing for long-term preservation of
the UCH in this and other developing countries.
INTRODUCTION
The Greater Antilles, and in particular the island of Hispaniola, was
the epicenter of the most transformative global event in recorded
human history when the old and new worlds encountered each other in
1492, initiating the Columbian exchange.' Over 500 years later, the
Dominican Republic is again the locus of a global collision, the meeting
of two seemingly disparate aspects of globalization: the international
convergence of valueS2 regarding preservation of maritime heritage and
the inexorable privatization of state responsibilities for managing it and
other resources. 3 These global trends have facilitated treasure hunters
from more developed nations like the United States in convincing the
Dominican Republic's resource managers to permit commercial salvage
of Dominican submerged cultural patrimony in spite of the harmful
environmental and long-term economic impacts, and in disregard of the
Dominican government's conservationist laws and policies.4 Allowing
such salvage is a departure from the international community's
emerging practice of preservation of the Underwater Cultural Heritage
1. See generally ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND
CULTURAL CONSEQUENCES OF 1492 (Praeger 2003) (1972) (chronicling the biological
exchange between the Americas and Europe that began in 1492). See also C.R., When Did
Globalisation Start?, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 23, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/freeexchange/2013/09/economic-history-1 (positing that "[a]lthough Adam Smith
himself never used the word, globalisation is a key theme in the Wealth of Nations[,]" and
that Smith argued "the discovery of the Americas, by Christopher Columbus in 1492,
accelerated the process of globalisation.").
2. See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 429, 429 (1997) ("Globalization is causing, and being reinforced by, a worldwide
convergence of economic and political values. . . .").
3. See generally, Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization: Legal Aspects (Aug. 28, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (examining the law's effect on the global
environment).
4. Margaret E. Leshikar-Denton & Pilar Luna Erreguerena, The Foundations of
Underwater and Maritime Archaeology in Latin America and the Caribbean, in
UNDERWATER AND MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 25, 26
(Margaret E. Leshikar-Denton & Pilar Luna Erreguerena, eds., 2008). See infra Part II,
for a detailed explanation of Dominican cultural resource management laws.
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(UCH) as reflected in the international cooperation on protecting it
through becoming a party to the 2001 United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001 Convention),5 or
using its Annex as a "best practices" guide.6 Furthermore, the trend in
private international law toward recognizing the importance of
conservation and preservation also calls into question the validity of
continuing to engage in treasure hunting even under the auspices of
traditional maritime salvage law.7
While there are both international agreements and domestic laws in
place available to protect and preserve UCH off the coast of the
Dominican Republic, the actual practice sees management
responsibility being delegated to privately run treasure-hunting
5. See generally Convention for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,
Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40 (2002) [hereinafter 2001 Convention]. This Note adopts the
definition of Underwater Cultural Heritage from the 2001 Convention, as it represents the
emerging international consensus on what is UCH: "all traces of human existence having
a cultural, historical or archaeological character which have been . . . under water . . . for
at least 100 years ..... See id. at art. 1. This could be a shipwreck, submerged city, or any
other artifact or human remain found underwater. As most UCH at risk in Dominican
waters are Spanish and other European Colonial shipwrecks or pre-Columbian artifacts,
the controversy over an appropriate temporal cutoff (i.e., at what age does an artifact
become "historical") is not at issue. However, in contrast to the 2001 Convention's
definition, I address only culturally and historically significant UCH in recognition that
the solution I propose (or any realistic solution) cannot possibly provide for management
of all UCH, and must be limited to significant sites.
6. The Society for Historical Archaeology, the largest scholarly group concerned with
the archaeology of the modern world (1400 AD-present), and the World Archaeological
Congress (the only elected international body of practicing archaeologists) collectively
represent the global professional archaeological community, and both support ratifying
the 2001 Convention. MARGARET LESHIKAR-DENTON, 2012 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE SHA
UNESCO COMMITTEE 1 (2012) (on file with author) ("The Committee supports the
international ratification and implementation of the 2001 UNESCO Convention, and the
adoption of its Annex as a 'best practices' document, even where ratification is unlikely;
places emphasis on facilitating training opportunities and public awareness; facilitates
NGO accreditation for SHA with the Meeting of States Parties; and monitors development
of the Operational Guidelines."); see also Press Release, World Archaeological Cong.,
Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention Needs to be Implemented (July 14, 2008),
available at http://www. worldarchaeologicalcongress.org/site/wacpress-20.php.
7. Even Professor David Bederman, a notable admiralty law scholar and proponent of
using salvage law to manage UCH, argues that "historic preservation values have been
merged with 'traditional' salvage law[,]" at least in the implementation of admiralty law in
the U.S. court system. David J. Bederman, The UNESCO Draft Convention On
Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Critique And Counter-Proposal, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM.
331, 345 (1999). See also Valentina Sara Vadi, Investing in Culture: Underwater Cultural
Heritage and International Investment Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 853, 867-69
(2009), for a detailed explanation of using private international law to manage UCH.
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companies for promises of short-term economic gain.8 This Note
suggests that instead of succumbing to this harmful aspect of the global
privatization and horizontal delegation trend, the Dominican
government should respond to its administrative and financial
challenges by authorizing a management framework that allocates
responsibilities among domestic and foreign state and nonstate actors
through a variant of Common-Pool Resource Management known as
Living Museums in the Sea. This strategy is consistent with existing
Dominican laws and the emerging international preservation consensus,
and could also relieve the economic pressures that forced the Dominican
government to privatize its UCH management in the first place.
Furthermore, it provides the potential for larger, more equitable, and
longer-lasting economic benefits than treasure hunting while also
preserving the UCH for present and future generations.
THE PROBLEM: TREASURE HUNTING OF SUBMERGED ARTIFACTS DESTROYS
CULTURAL PATRIMONY AND THE FRAGILE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
The ever-increasing pace of artifact discovery and the rapid
degradation of the ocean environment necessitate disincentivizing
developing countries like the Dominican Republic from selling or
privatizing the management of their submerged cultural patrimonies.9
Treasure hunters prey on lesser-developed countries that permit
8. Peter Throckmorton, The World's Worst Investment: The Economics of Treasure
Hunting with Real Life Comparisons, 1990 UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROC. FROM
SOC'Y FOR HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY CONF. 6, 7.
9. Although there is ongoing debate between the archaeological and commercial
salvage (i.e., treasure hunter) camps about whether "commercial archaeology" (the
excavation and sale of artifacts for profit) can be done in a way that preserves the
historical and environmental integrity of the sites, I, in addition to many scholars,
environmental and archaeological managers, and government officials, fundamentally
disagree. See George F. Bass, After the Diving is Over, 1990 UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY
PROC. FROM SOC'Y FOR HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY CONF. 10, 10-12 (explaining that good
archaeological technique does not equal good archaeology); see also George F. Bass, The
Development of Maritime Archaeology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MARITIME
ARCHAEOLOGY 11-14 (Alexis Catsambis et al. eds., 2011) (explaining the fundamental
incompatibility of archaeology and treasure hunting). Furthermore, I have a more
fundamental problem with the for-profit excavation and sale of artifacts from an
extremely fragile marine environment such as in the Dominican Republic. But see
generally Underwater Cultural Heritage & UNESCO in New Orleans: An Introduction,
ODYSSEY PAPERS No. 13 (Odyssey Marine Exploration), 2010, available at http://www.
shipwreck.net/pdf/OMEPapersl3-UNESCO.pdf, for the perspective of the commercial
treasure salvage industry. This article does not take issue with cultural resource
management firms, such as those organized under the American Cultural Resources
Association (http://www.acra-crm.org), which have a long history of conducting competent
and ethical excavation for profit, but only the commercial exploitation of artifacts.
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treasure hunting in a desperate attempt to exert some kind of control
over the exploitation of their heritage. Treasure hunters "entice
governments with promises of sure profits, but the overall result has
been the destruction of LAC [Latin American and Caribbean] heritage
sites and no sign of [long-term] financial reward for participating
countries."o Not only do the proceeds from treasuring hunting fail to
"provide vast sums to local coffers,"" but this unscientific salvage of
UCH also destroys what would otherwise be its sustainable value as an
educational tool or tourist attraction. 12 Artifacts have only one chance to
be properly excavated, and following correct excavation protocol is
impossible for companies beholden to shareholders and working toward
a singular goal: recovering investments through the discovery of
treasure. 3 On top of this loss of cultural patrimony and historical data,
the profit-driven treasure salvage industry inevitably causes the
destruction of resources invaluable to the ecosystem around the
shipwreck sites, harming threatened or endangered marine life
dependent on these sites where shipwrecks have been integrated into
the environment. 14
10. Leshikar-Denton & Erreguerena, supra note 4.
11. George F. Bass, Archaeology Versus Treasure Hunting, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
ARCHAEOLOGY 58, 58 (Larry J. Zimmerman, et al. eds., 2003).
12. See Importance of the Archaeological Record, NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY PROGRAM AT
TEX. A&M UNIv., http://nautarch.tamu.edu/class/anth3l8/Class%2003-%20Importance%
20of%20Nautical%20Archaeology.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). See also generally
NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC Ass'N, SUPPLEMENT TO FINAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE FINAL MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR
THE FLORIDA KEYS NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY: COMMERCIAL TREASURE SALVORS
(1997), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/060197_rfa keys salvors.pdf
(providing a detailed economic impact analysis of the treasure salvage industry in
Florida). The paper concludes that the treasure hunting enterprises are "high risk
speculative" gambles in which few companies make a profit. Id. at 27. It also states that in
balance, the potential benefits to tourism from in situ preservation of submerged cultural
resources outweighs the relatively minor economic impact on commercial treasure salvors
resulting from sanctuary regulations. Id. at 84.
13. See Beth Read, Open Season on Ancient Shipwrecks: Implications of the Treasure
Salvors Decisions in the Fields of Archaeology, History, and Property Law, 4 NOVA L.J.
213, 226-27 n.63 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting D. Mathewson, Method and Theory
of Marine Archaeology (1978) (unpublished thesis) (on file with Florida Atlantic
University Library)), for an excerpt from D. Mathewson, an archaeologist who worked
with treasure hunters, comparing archaeological excavations with salvage operations and
concluding that "[rlesources for conducting archaeological research from within the
salvage company had to be balanced against the priorities and expectations of the
commercial operation. Under such a situation, it was impossible to develop a proper
excavation program. . . ."
14. OFFICE OF UNDERWATER SC., IND. UNIV., INDIANA UNIVERSITY UNDERWATER
ARCHAEOLOGY TECHNIQUES TRAINING BOOKLET: METHODOLOGY FOR INVESTIGATING
SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATED BIODIVERSITY 13, 45 (Charles D.
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Within the United States, a full spectrum of laws and management
regimes preserves natural and cultural heritage through a number of
strategies, including banning the application of the law of salvage and
finds and contract salvage, prohibiting uncontrolled treasure hunting,
and regulating commercial salvage or recovery in accordance with
professional archaeological standards.15 As the laws and policies of the
United States and other more developed nations severely restrict
treasure hunting and make commercial salvage less profitable in those
places, the lesser-developed countries become more viable alternatives.
These countries therefore risk creating additional cultural and natural
resource inequalities with the global "north" if they privatize already
vulnerable regulatory institutions,1 6 much as they suffered tremendous
income disparities at the turn of the twenty-first century due to the
same phenomena.1 7 Yet, despite the considerable drawbacks of treasure
hunting, the short-term financial incentives of being one of the few
Beeker & Frederick H. Hanselmann eds., 2009) (establishing that shipwrecks are
substrate for marine life, in particular coral); see also United States v. Fisher, 977 F.
Supp. 1193 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (enjoining treasure hunters from using destructive excavation
technique involving blowing huge holes in the ocean floor in the Florida Keys National
Marine Sanctuary, and holding them liable for several hundred thousand dollars for the
damage and destruction of seagrass beds important to the coral reef ecosystem).
15. See, e.g., 2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE ET AL., FLORIDA KEYS NATIONAL MARINE
SANCTUARY, FINAL MANAGEMENT PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 171 (1996),
available at http://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/library/pdfs/fknms-fmpfeis_1996.pdf; NAT'L
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 12, at 2.
16. Cf. Vadi, supra note 7, at 898. Vadi recommends using a form of privatized
management of UCH called the "smart salvage" approach, which entails giving salvors the
opportunity to cooperate in the management of UCH after its recovery and share
subsequent revenues (from tourism or museum admissions) with the state for a period of
time. I agree with her assertion that "states should not be considered owners but rather
guardians or custodians of these cultural goods," and that her recommendations are an
improvement over traditional salvage law, which rewards salvors for "rescuing" (i.e.,
looting) historic wrecks, often with "a generous percentage of the value of the salvaged
vessel or part of the proceedings from the sale or auction of recovered treasures and
artifacts." See id. at 867-69, 898 (explaining principles of salvage under maritime law).
However, her recommendation perpetuates the unethical commercialization of artifacts by
legitimizing profit-driven excavation activities. Mgreover, it is particularly inappropriate
to the Dominican context due to pervasive corruption. See CARL MEACHAM, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: BECOMING A ONE-PARTY STATE?
At VI (2013) ("The history of corruption and poor rule of law in the Dominican Republic is
long-many even refer to a 'culture of corruption' that characterizes the country's political
system. But however storied the country's experience with corruption may be, it cannot be
denied that the problem has grown-and quickly-in recent years.").
17. See Nancy Birdsall, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Remarks at
Overseas Development Council Conference, Making Globalization Work: Globalization




remaining treasure-hunter friendly regimes,18 combined with the lack of
resources to manage its own submerged cultural heritage, compel the
Dominican government to allow foreign treasure-hunting colnpanies to
contract out excavation on swaths of its coastline in return for a
relatively paltry fee and a fifty-fifty split of the recovered artifacts.19
Nevertheless, this same government clearly recognizes the emerging
international consensus around the treatment of UCH; in 2011, the
Dominican Republic hosted a national consultation meeting for the 2001
Convention, a treaty that expressly prohibits the practice of
uncontrolled treasure hunting.20
The Janus-faced nature of globalization-simultaneously causing
increased privatization of government responsibilities and
harmonization of values, in concert with the unique character of UCH
as a cultural and often also natural resource 2L-thus poses complex
problems for conservationists, policymakers, and advocates for justice in
developing countries. The challenge for any nation, particularly a lesser-
developed one, is how to responsibly manage a resource that involves a
multitude of local, national, and global stakeholders with limited
human and financial resources and technical expertise. Even developed
18. See E-mail from Dick Borman, Manager of Los Cayos LLC, to unnamed members of
Los Cayos LLC (Aug. 17, 2007, 22:53 MST) (on file with author) (expressing dismay over
his company's recently cancelled contract with the Dominican government, as the
Dominican Republic "is the only place in the world to look for sunken historical wrecks.").
Los Cayos LLC is a now-defunct treasure hunting company that operated in the
Dominican Republic.
19. See Charles D. Beeker, Living Museums in the Sea-Shipwrecks as Marine
Protected Areas: A Personal Odyssey in Pursuit of Shipwreck Preservation, UNDERSEA J.,
Third Quarter 2010, at 47 (describing the typical treasure hunting contract made between
foreign investors and the Dominican government, which calls for a fifty-fifty split between
the parties).
20. National Consultation Meeting on Underwater Cultural Heritage in the Dominican
Republic, 27-28 June 2011, UNESCO, http://www.lacult.org/proyectos/showitem.php?
uid ext=&getipr=NjYuMjQ5LjclLjkz&g-2&id=110&paginasweb=31&idtitulo=1589 (last
visited Nov. 9, 2013). However, under the express ban against applying the law of salvage
and finds, there is an exception providing nations the authority to implement the 2001
Convention under maritime law provided the authorization is consistent with the
Convention, including the Annex Rules. 2001 Convention, supra note 5, art. 4.
21. I refer to shipwrecks as a potential natural resource due to the fact that they often
serve as de facto artificial reefs and support a localized ecosystem. See Why Preserve
Shipwrecks, NArL PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/nr/travellflshipwrecks/whypreserve.htm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2014). Whether to characterize shipwrecks as a biological or natural
resource in a legal sense and therefore open further avenues for states to exert jurisdiction
over shipwrecks in their Exclusive Economic Zone is outside the scope of this Note. The
appropriateness of doing so, at least under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, has been disputed in the literature. See, e.g., Bernard H. Oxman, Marine
Archaeology and the International Law of the Sea, 12 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 353, 366
(1988).
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nations like the United States are having difficulty preserving,
conserving, and curating their UCH. So, even if the Dominican
government does retain ownership of all of its artifacts, how can it
possibly conserve them indefinitely so that the artifacts retain their true
value?22 Despite the development of public and private international
law to preserve cultural heritage and the enactment of historic
preservation laws by the Dominican government, some Dominican
officials still offer short-term salvage agreements to private foreign
companies that ruin any chance for longer-term economic benefits and
result in privatization of public cultural patrimony. Given the obviously
inequitable results of this iteration of the horizontal delegation of state
power to private actors, what management framework can provide an
alterative solution?
ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
This Note responds to these questions through a three-part study of
the Dominican situation that provides a new, globalized analysis to
illustrate the appropriateness of a less state-centric and more
community-based management solution. In Part I, I examine the global
trends in UCH management law and policy to provide the context and
rationalization for the contrasting situation in the Dominican Republic.
Part II outlines the legal framework of UCH management in the
Dominican Republic as a cautionary tale of privatization of public UCH
management gone awry despite contrary national intentions. This
second section will also engage with proponents of increased
governmental control and the use of the limited sale of artifacts or other
involvement of commercial treasure salvors as solutions to UCH
management. In the final section, Part III, I propose a globalization-
appropriate solution: Indiana University's Living Museums in the Sea
(LMS) model. In doing so, I apply Elinor Ostrom's Common-Pool
Resource Management theory, with Multilevel Environmental
Governance power-sharing theory23 standing in for Ostrom's eighth
factor, to the Dominican legal, cultural, and physical landscapes to
22. Michael Bawaya, Curation in Crisis, 317 SCIENCE 1025, 1025 (2007) (detailing the
difficulties faced by U.S. collections managers in providing proper long-term care for
artifacts). If U.S. archaeologists can barely keep up with the amount of artifacts being
recovered, how can managers in developing countries be expected to properly preserve
artifacts and thus ensure that they retain scientific value once they are removed from the
water?
23. Multi-level governance theory echoes globalization theory's focus on the nation
state's delegation of power to nonstate entities. See Katarina Eckerberg & Marko Joas,




analyze if, why, and how the LMS model can be successfully
implemented in the Dominican Republic.
I. THE GLOBAL TREND IN UNDERWATER CULTURAL
HERITAGE MANAGEMENT
Contemporary UCH management is a transnational, globalized
issue. Defined as "the process of denationalization of clusters of political,
economic, and social activities" that "encompasses legal relationships
involving domestic and international law as well as private ordering
involving a host of nonstate actors who operate transnationally,"24
globalization and the emergence of transnational law have made
progress protecting UCH under historic preservation laws in response to
the use of private international law of salvage. Although the time-
honored concepts of the commercial laws of salvage and finds are still
employed by the treasure salvage industry to claim their booty under
government authorization, 25 the international community of states is
gradually26 tacking toward a historic preservation regime that closely
aligns to the professional archaeological community's ethics, including
the uniform rejection of commercial exploitation. 27
24. See Aman, supra note 3, at 2.
25. See, for example, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked
Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1166 (11th Cir. 2011), for a recent, infamous case of a treasure
hunting company staking an ultimately unsuccessful "possessory and ownership claim
pursuant to the law of finds (Count One), as well as a salvage award claim pursuant to the
law of salvage (Count Two)." See also Fathom Exploration, LLC v. Unidentified
Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (S.D. Ala. 2005), for an
illustration of the process a treasure hunting company utilizes under the laws of salvage
and finds to secure exclusive title to a wreck. The Court in this case also prevented the
State of Alabama from dismissing the salvor's action due to the possibility that the wreck
lay within state waters and was therefore state property under the Abandoned Shipwreck
Act. The Court stated that "[t]o bar a party from pursuing legal action to secure and
maintain exclusive salvage rights on a shipwreck until such time as the party can
precisely identify the wreck would do violence to time-honored admiralty principles
relating to salvage." Id. at 1224.
26. I use the term "gradually" because there are only forty-eight parties to the 2001
Convention, with Cambodia being the only Asian nation. See Convention on the Protection
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/erilla/
convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E&order-alpha#1 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
27. See Code of Conduct 1.2(e), REGISTER OF PROFESSIONAL ARCHAEOLOGISTS,
http://www.rpanet.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr-3 (last visited Oct. 17,
2013). The heritage of all mankind concept stems from "the Preamble to the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
according to which damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means
damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution
to the culture of the world." Francesco Francioni, Public and Private in the International
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The global harmonization of laws at the domestic level is typically
described as the phenomenon of states incorporating the legislation to
implement treaties or conventions agreed to by nations under the
auspices of international organizations. For example, states may
implement domestic laws in agreement with the International Maritime
Organization's uniform rules on safety in navigation and protecting the
marine environment from international shipping, or the World Trade
Organization's uniform rules on trade.28 The current situation of UCH
management on a global scale illustrates this type of harmonization
emanating from an agreement among nations on the minimum
standards and requirements they will hold themselves and persons
subject to their jurisdiction to through implementing domestic statutes
and regulations.
A. The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage
The United Nations' International Law Commission's first note of
UCH is found in a 1956 preparatory report for the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), which noted that UCH
was not a natural resource of the Continental Shelf and thus there were
no rights of coastal state jurisdiction over UCH on the Continental
Shelf.29 While the treatment of UCH was not addressed in any of the
1958 Conventions resulting from UNCLOS I, the issue was addressed in
articles 149 and 303 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC) that represented the culmination of UNCLOS III.3o
The negotiators recognized that this framework did not adequately
address the issue, evidenced by article 303(4)'s contemplation of a
convention that would specifically address objects of a historical or
archaeological interest found at sea.31 In 1987, the commercial salvage
of artifacts from the Titanic wreck site awakened the world to the fact
Protection of Global Cultural Goods, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 719, 719 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
28. See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Globalization from the Ground Up: A Domestic Perspective,
in 2 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 9-11 (Beverley Crawford
ed., 2008).
29. SARAH DROMGOOLE, UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
29-30 (2013) (citing Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 8th Sess., April 23-July 4, 1956, U.N.
Doc. A/3159; GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9 (1956)).
30. Ole Varmer, Closing the Gaps in the Law Protecting Underwater Cultural Heritage
on the Outer Continental Shelf, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 251, 258-60 (2014) [hereinafter
Closing the Gaps].
31. Id. at 262.
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that all UCH was now accessible for commercial exploitation. 32 The
International Law Association's Committee on Cultural Heritage Law
began drafting a convention to address UCH in 1988,33 and UNESCO34
itself began officially addressing the matter in 1993 through a feasibility
study for the creation of a UCH convention.35 The study recognized that
the existing international legal framework governing maritime
activities through the LOSC was inadequate to protect UCH from
looting and unregulated salvage.3 6 Furthermore, the study found that
although an international instrument to protect UCH could be created,
it would have to address jurisdiction of coastal states and how to control
activities directed at UCH beyond coastal state jurisdictional limits
under the LOSC; "the place of salvage law"; and which archaeological or
professional standards to use as a benchmark for judging the
appropriateness of activities directed at UCH.37
The 2001 Convention 38 is thus the culmination of decades of
contentious, yet ultimately fruitful, debate at the global level over the
management of UCH.39 Under the 2001 Convention, States Parties
agreed to take action to protect and preserve all UCH,40 stipulating that
"in situ preservation shall be considered as the first option" for the
32. See DROMGOOLE, supra note 29, at 48.
33. Id. at 49-50 ("This draft ... was then forwarded to UNESCO for consideration and
became the 'blueprint for the development of the [2001 Convention]."' (quoting PATRICK J.
O'KEEFE, SHIPWRECKED HERITAGE: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO CONVENTION ON
UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE 23 (2002))).
34. Introducing UNESCO: What We Are, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC, AND
CULTURAL ORG., http://www.unesco.org/new/enlunesco/about-us/who-we-are/introducing-
unesco/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) ("UNESCO's mission is to contribute to the building of
peace, the eradication of poverty, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue
through education, the sciences, culture, communication and information.").
35. U.N. Educ., Scientific, and Cultural Org. Exec. Bd., Feasibility Study for the
Drafting of a New Instrument for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, U.N.
Doc. 146 EX/27 (Mar. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Feasibility Study].
36. See id. 41.
37. DROMGOOLE, supra note 29, at 53.
38. See generally 2001 Convention, supra note 5.
39. See generally DROMGOOLE, supra note 29, at 28-64, for a detailed discussion of the
evolution of international law on underwater cultural heritage culminating in the 2001
Convention.
40. See 2001 Convention, supra note 5, art. 2 ("States Parties shall, individually or
jointly as appropriate, take all appropriate measures in conformity with this Convention
and with international law that are necessary to protect underwater cultural heritage,
using for this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with
their capabilities."); see also id. art. 7, 10, 12 (discussing treatment of UCH in internal
waters, archipelagic waters and in the territorial sea; in the exclusive economic zone and
on the continental shelf- and in the Area, respectively).
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treatment of UCH41 and explicitly rejecting the commercial exploitation
of UCH.42 Perhaps because of the existing international recognition of
archaeological standards such as the International Council on
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) Charter of 1996, the Annex to the
Convention laying out the rules for activities directed at UCH has
proven to be the instrument's most influential aspect. Not only has the
academic archaeological community worldwide wholeheartedly adopted
the Annex,43 "the Annex was unanimously adopted by all Member
States, even by those countries which have no intention of ratifying the
Convention."44
Concededly, the 2001 Convention remains a controversial
instrument to a few major maritime powers such as Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.45 It nonetheless must be recognized as
41. Id. Annex; see also About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/newlen/culture/themes/underwater-
cultural-heritage/2001-convention/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
42. Id. art. 2 ("Underwater cultural heritage shall not be commercially exploited.").
43. See LESHIKAR-DENTON, supra note 6, at 1; see also Rules Concerning Activities
Directed at Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/
culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/200 1-convention/annex-of-the-convention/
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014) ('The 36 Rules of the Annex present a directly applicable
operation scheme for underwater interventions. Over the years, they have become a
reference document in the field of underwater archaeology, setting out regulations for the
responsible management of such cultural heritage.").
44. Ricardo L. Favis, Unit 1: The 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, in TRAINING MANUAL FOR THE UNESCO FOUNDATION COURSE ON THE
PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC 2, 6 (Martijn R. Manders et al. eds., 2012); see also Vadi, supra note 7, at 865-66
("[T]he Annex benefited from unanimous support at the time of its adoption.... As the
Annex is widely recognized as embodying professional norm guidelines, it might be
replicated in national legislations without the need for ratifying the CPUCH.").
45. See Ole Varmer, Jefferson Gray & David Alberg, United States: Responses to the
2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 5 J.
MAR. ARCHAEOLOGY 129, 131 (2010) (discussing U.S. support for most of the Convention
and concerns or reservations about creeping jurisdiction and treatment of warships within
territorial sea). However, France has become a party and Germany and the Netherlands
are preparing to ratify the 2001 Convention. It therefore appears that the small number of
major maritime powers that still have concerns is shrinking. See States Parties to the
Convention of the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2013) (France, Italy, and
Spain are maritime powers party to the convention). France ratified the convention in
2013, which a UNESCO press release stated "illustrates the growing support by large
maritime powers for this instrument and for the protection of the submerged heritage."
See France Ratifies the UNESCO 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-
services/single-view/news/france ratifiestheunesco_2001_convention on-the-protection
of the underwater cultural heritage/#.UrXMLmRDvTk. See also Gonzalo Rodriguez
Prado, Germany Prepares for the Ratification of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection
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the expression of a growing number of states of the importance of
applying professional archaeological standards to UCH, and has
undoubtedly influenced how the parties to the 2001 Convention and
even some other nations manage their UCH.46 Professors Toshiyuki
Kono and Stefan Wrbka point to Italy as an example of a nation that
expressly incorporated some of the protections of the 2001 Convention
before it became a party to it.47 Moreover, the concerns of the major
maritime powers (particularly the United States, the United Kingdom,
and Russia) to the protections of UCH enshrined in the 2001
Convention have been limited to issues of so-called "creeping" coastal
state jurisdiction and the treatment of sunken warships rather than to
the actual concept of limiting the commercial exploitation of UCH.48 The
United States supports the overall goal and concept of protecting UCH
by prohibiting its commercial exploitation, preferring in situ
preservation and requiring that archaeological standards be applied
when it is determined that recovery is necessary or appropriate. 49 As
of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNITED NATIONS NIPPON FOUND. FELLOWSHIP
ALUMNI. PARIS, 2ND NOVEMBER 2001 (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.unfalumni.org/germany-
prepares-for-the-ratification-of-the-unesco-convention-on-the-protection-of-the-
underwater-cultural-heritage-paris-2nd-november-2001/; Dalya Alberge, Britain Urged to
Sign Up to Shipwreck Treaty to Protect Underwater Heritage, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 22,
2014, 8:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/23/government-urged-
sign-shipwreck-treaty ("Britain was initially supportive of the treaty during 2001 draft
negotiations, but abstained from voting fearing that it would not attract universal
support. Since then, the report notes, several historically seafaring states that previously
shared British concerns have now signed up. These include Spain, Portugal and France.
The Netherlands, another key state, is now reconsidering its position, Cunliffe said.
'Germany is nearly there and Denmark is working on it fast. So we would be the only ones
who hadn't."').
46. See Jean-Louis Luxen, Reflections on the Use of Heritage Charters and Conventions,
THE GETTY CONSERVATION INST. (2004), http://www.getty.edu/conservation/
publications resources/newsletters/19_2/feature.html ("With regard to practice, the norms
expressed in charters and [UNESCO] conventions have had a positive effect all over the
world. Their general message has been acknowledged, and recommendations have been
widely followed. In nearly all countries, professionals have drawn up inventories of
heritage, often accompanied by thematic reports and scientific publications. Official
services have been established, creating a systematic policy on conservation and providing
a framework for the management of sites. Despite divergences and errors, in general such
practices seek to follow standards considered universal, as laid down in international
texts.").
47. Toshiyuki Kono & Stefan Wrbka, General Report, in THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM
LAWS ON THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL
HERITAGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 199-200 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2010).
48. See Varmer, Gray & Alberg, supra note 45.
49. See Statement of Robert C. Blumberg, U.S. Observer Delegate to the 31st UNESCO
General Conference, to Commission IV of the General Conference, Regarding the U.S.
Views on the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage
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such, the 2001 Convention should be viewed as a powerful normative
and harmonizing force.
B. Some Notable Domestic Laws and Private Party Protections for UCH
The domestic legislation of nations host to significant UCH or
treasure-hunting companies (or both), yet not party to the 2001
Convention, also evidences the materialization of an overall respect for
the extra-monetary importance of UCH. Although home to the majority
of treasure-hunting companies,50 protections for UCH within U.S. state
and national territorial waters, and to some extent out onto the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf,5 ' are so restrictive that many would-be
treasure hunters are deterred from operating in their home country.52
The U.S. government initially hindered-but did not strike a fatal
blow-to the treasure-hunting industry with the 1987 Abandoned
Shipwreck Act (ASA).53 The ASA was passed in light of mounting
(Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.ge.noaa.gov/documents/gcil-heritage2_blumberg.pdf;
Statement of Ray Wanner, U.S. Observer Delegate to the 31st UNESCO General
Conference Before the General Conference Plenary Regarding the U.S. Views on the
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (Nov. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil-heritage2_wanner.pdf.
50. Craig Forrest, Historic Wreck Salvage: An International Perspective, 33 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 347, 349 (2009) ("The U.S. treasure salvage industry is the largest, most technically
advanced, and best funded in the world.").
51. See, e.g., National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431 (2006) (authorizing the
Secretary of Commerce to protect areas of the marine environment as officially designated
marine sanctuaries due to their significant conservation, recreational, ecological,
historical, scientific, cultural, archeological, educational, or esthetic qualities).
52. See Interview with Charles Beeker, Professor, Ind. Univ., in Santo Domingo, Dom.
Rep. (Jan. 2011) ("Treasure wars in America are over, but places like the Dominican
Republic where you can still do a 50-50 split with the government under Presidential
Decree makes it one of the few remaining places in the world where treasure hunters can
ply their trade."). Despite the suite of protective laws detailed in Part I.B, some states still
grant treasure-hunting concessions. See, e.g., Underwater Archaeology Frequently Asked
Questions, FLA. DEP'T STATE DIv. HISTORICAL RES., http://www.flheritage.com/
archaeology/underwaterfaq.cfm#22 (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) ("Some companies have
applied for and received Exploration and Recovery Permits as administered by Rule 1A-31
of the Florida Administrative Code. The State of Florida will issue an Exploration or
Recovery Permit after the applicant has met the stringent archaeological requirements.").
For an example of a treasure hunting company that apparently has a concession from
Florida, see QUEEN'S JEWELS LLC, http://www.1715treasurefleet.com/ (last visited Oct. 17,
2014) ("1715 Fleet - Queens Jewels, LLC is a group of Historic Shipwreck Salvors focused
on the exploration and recovery of the famous 1715 Plate Fleet. We currently operate the
largest permitted salvage operation in Florida waters.").
53. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2105-2106 (2006). Treasure hunters with preexisting claims are not
subject to the ASA. See 43 U.S.C. § 2106(c) (2006) ("This chapter shall not affect any legal
proceeding brought prior to April 28, 1988."). See also Closing the Gaps, supra note 30, at
COMMUNITY-BASED STRATEGY
evidence that increasing numbers of people were not only visiting
shipwrecks, but were also removing artifacts and thus irreparably
damaging the archaeological record and causing the loss of U.S. and
human history.54 Under the Act, the U.S. government asserted title to
any abandoned shipwreck "(1) embedded in submerged lands of a State;
(2) embedded in coralline formations protected by a State on submerged
lands of a State; or (3) on submerged lands of a State and is included in
or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register,"55 then
transferred title of said wrecks "to the State in or on whose submerged
lands the shipwreck[s are] located."56 It is important to note that
although the text of the Act mandates that states "manage" shipwreck
resources and develop protective policies with which to do so, the ASA
also requires states to develop policies that "allow for appropriate public
and private sector recovery of shipwrecks consistent with the protection
of historical values and environmental integrity of the shipwrecks and
the sites."5 7 While commercial exploitation is in direct conflict with the
2001 Convention, the ASA provides for the participation of private
commercial companies in protecting shipwrecks in a way that is
consistent with the 2001 Convention,5 8 provided the company's activities
are consistent with the Convention and its Annex Rules.
. The Sunken Military Craft Act (SMCA) is another U.S. law that
makes it difficult to treasure hunt in the United States and pushes U.S.
treasure hunters to seek more favorable conditions in the lands and
waters of lesser-developed nations.59 The SMCA was passed with the
intent of "protect[ing] sunken military vessels and aircraft and the
273-76 (detailing some notable legal battles between treasure hunters and the states
under the ASA).
54. See Protection of Historic Shipwrecks and the National Maritime Museum: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands and Reserved Water, S. Energy and Natural Res.
Comm., 98th Cong. 30 (1983).
55. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (2006).
56. Id. § 2105(c).
57. 43 U.S.C. § 2103(a)(2)(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
58. See 2001 Convention, supra note 5, art. 4. Article 4 provides an exception to the
general ban on the application of the law of salvage and finds for those nations wishing to
use salvage law to implement the Convention. Additionally, when a nation joins the
Convention, it has the discretion to exclude its application within territorial waters. See
id. art. 29. Thus, if the United States were to join, it could exclude state lands and waters
already subject to the ASA. Furthermore, unlike the ASA, the 2001 Convention "does not
regulate the ownership of submerged historic remains." Frequently Asked Questions,
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-
heritage/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). Ownership of property is
handled so differently by different nations that providing for ownership of shipwrecks in
the Convention would likely have made it impossible to reach a consensus.
59. Sunken Military Craft Act of 2004, 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2012).
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remains of their crews from unauthorized disturbance" wherever those
vessels may lie.60 Treasure hunters argue that the law's scope is too
broad, as according to their understanding "ships in military service
could mean anything from a World War II vessel carrying silver bars to
a Spanish galleon returning from the New World with gold."6 1 As
evidenced by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
and the Eleventh Circuit's classification of the silver- and gold-laden
Spanish frigate Nuestra Seiiora de las Mercedes (sunk in 1804) as a
naval vessel, it is clear that the treasure hunters' worst fears may have
been realized. 62 Whether the SMCA is actually so expansive may be
further clarified in the implementing regulations, which have been
proposed but not published in final version at the time of the writing of
this Note.63
The U.S. judicial system, though traditionally a stalwart defender of
individual property rights under the U.S. Constitution, has also shown
remarkable concern for preserving the archaeological integrity of the
UCH (particularly shipwrecks), even when state protections through the
ASA or other federal cultural protection laws are not applicable. 64 The
company Sea Hunt brought an in rem action against two Spanish
frigates--the Juno and La Galga-in order to solidify its salvage
rights. Even though Sea Hunt obtained the proper permits from the
State of Virginia65 (in whose waters the wrecks lay) to conduct salvage,
60. Protection for Sunken Military Vessels and Aircraft, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE
COMMAND, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/orgl2-12.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
61. Vernon Silver, Treasure Hunters' Undersea Gold Rush Is Threatened by U.S. Navy,
BLOOMBERG BUsINESSWEEK (May 5, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-
05-05/treasure-hunters-undersea-gold-rush-threatened-by-u-dot-s-dot-navy; see also Peter
B. Campbell & Rodrigo Pacheco-Ruiz, Treasure Hunting Is the World's Worst Investment,
BLOOMBEROVIEW (May 7, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-07/
treasure-hunting-is-the-world-s-worst-investment (stating that "the U.S. Navy plans to
redefine the Sunken Military Craft Act to include everything from historic galleons to
Merchant Marine vessels from World War I and II").
62. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F.
Supp. 2d 1126, 1129 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd, 657 F.3d 1159, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011).
63. Guidelines for Permitting Archaeological Investigations and Other Activities
Directed at Sunken Military Craft and Terrestrial Military Craft Under the Jurisdiction of
the Department of the Navy, 79 Fed. Reg. 620 (proposed Jan. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 32
C.F.R. pt. 767).
64. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a-470x-6 (2006);
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006);
Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (2006).
65. Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (4th
Cir. 2000). The State of Virginia argued that it owned the wrecks under the ASA and
authorized the commercial salvage of the wrecks pursuant to a contract with a private for
profit commercial salvor. Id. at 639.
216
COMMUNITY-BASED STRATEGY
the Fourth Circuit held that Spain had not abandoned the shipwrecks,66
and that since they were still owned by Spain and subject to sovereign
immunity, Spain had the right to deny any salvage or award.67 The
court also pointed to Spain's "wishes to maintain [La Galga] as a sacred
military gravesite" as reason why "a finding of implied abandonment
would be improper."66 As Virginia lacked the authority to issue a permit
for salvage in the first place due to the finding of non-abandonment, Sea
Hunt may be argued to be an admonition to the State of Virginia and
other states that work with treasure hunters as well as to treasure
hunters themselves. U.S. treasure-hunting companies also suffered
notable setbacks after the extensive litigation surrounding the Titanic
and Nuestra Seilora de las Mercedes cases, even though these
shipwrecks lay outside of U.S. territorial waters.69
Professor James A. R. Nafziger asserts that the Titanic and Sea
Hunt cases are evidence of the "development of a more cosmopolitan
approach" that seeks "to apply the jus gentium and conventional
international law more credibly and responsibly."70 National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration International Section Attorney-
Advisor Ole Varmer added that "[e]ven judges sitting in Admiralty are
recognizing the importance of international co-operation on the
protection of UCH in accordance with the [Convention]," and asserted
that although the United States is not a signatory to the Convention,
66. Id. at 647.
67. Id. at 642-43.
68. Id. at 647.
69. See Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F.
Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff'd, 657 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011) (ordering
treasure hunting company to return artifacts including 594,000 silver and gold coins to
Spain). See also R.M.S. Titanic, Inc., v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, its Engines,
Tackle, Apparel, Appurtenances, Cargo, etc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 508, 509 (E.D. Va. 2011)
(granting title to the Titanic artifacts to salvage company R.M.S. Titanic "subject to the
covenants and conditions that the United States, through the United States Attorney,
negotiated and finalized with RMST and the court[,]" which included having to keep the
collection intact and available for public display and scientific research, rendering the
artifacts essentially unsellable). While I interpret this outcome as a deterrent for other
treasure hunting companies, RMS Titanic, Inc. has been able to monetize the Titanic
artifacts through ticket sales to museum exhibits. RMS Titanic, Inc., PREMIER
EXHIBITIONS, http://www.premierexhibitions.com/corporate/all/rms-titanic-inc (last visited
Jan. 21, 2015).
70. See James A.R. Nafziger, United States, in THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM LAWS ON THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 757, 764 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2010) (explaining that there are three
key features in the effort to develop of a more cosmopolitan approach: "to fashion a
constructive in rem basis of adjudicatory jurisdiction; to apply the jus gentium and
conventional international law more credibly and responsibly; and to redefine the general
maritime law in terms of comparative insights and law-of-the-sea norms").
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"most of the relevant [U.S.] federal agencies have indicated that they
comply with the [2001 Convention] Rules in the Annex or comparable
rules or guidelines."71 When viewed as a collective body of law, the
actions of the various entities making up the U.S. government evidence
that "[a]lthough the United States [is] not [party] to the Convention, [it]
compl[ies] with the terms of the Annex Rules and, therefore, ha[s]
arguably accepted the terms of the Annex Rules as a matter of
custom." 72 Yet, as enlightened as these recent developments in U.S.
jurisprudence may appear, they do not provide reliable protection to
UCH outside of the United States, particularly for UCH located within
the coastal state jurisdiction of nations in the global south that may
ignore these precedents and apply their own laws. Notably, the
Mercedes case involved claims of ownership and sovereign immunity by
Spain, the complaints of Peru who also claimed ownership of the UCH,73
and the assertions of ownership by the salvor, all being appropriately
dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit as a private salvor should not be able
to put a U.S. Admiralty Judge in the position of resolving a dispute
between Spain and Peru merely because the in rem action was filed in
the United States. 74 The lower court (whose decision was upheld by the
Eleventh Circuit) correctly found that the dispute was more
appropriately addressed in Spain because the Mercedes was a Spanish
warship;75 ordered the return of all of the silver, gold, and other
artifacts to Spain;76 and ultimately ordered the salvor to pay over
$1,000,000 of Spain's legal fees.77
The United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway (among others) have
also extended protections to UCH within their maritime zones through
domestic legislation in accordance with the emerging international
norms without becoming party to the 2001 Convention. The United
71. Ole Varmer, United States: Responses to the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, in 21 JOINT NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY
POL'Y COMM. 61, 61 (2011).
72. Laura Gongaware, To Exhibit or not to Exhibit?: Establishing a Middle Ground for
Commercially Exploited Underwater Cultural Heritage Under The 2001 UNESCO
Convention, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 203, 206 (2012) (citing Interview with Ole Varmer, Att'y-
Advisor, Nat'1 Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., in D.C. (Aug. 5, 2011)).
73. See Amber Crossman Cheng, All in the Same Boat? Indigenous Property Rights in
Underwater Cultural Heritage, 32 Hous. J. INT'L L. 695, 699-702 (2010), for a discussion
of Peru's claims to the treasure and the property rights of indigenous peoples in UCH.
74. See 657 F.3d at 1171 ("If the res at issue is the property of a foreign state, the
federal courts only have jurisdiction to arrest the res if authorized by the FSIA [Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act].").
75. Id. at 1166.
76. 675 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
77. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 979 F. Supp.
2d 1270, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
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Kingdom's Protection of Wrecks Act of 1973 "provide[s] the country's
initial authority for the protection of historic shipwrecks" and was
expanded in 2002 with passage of the National Heritage Act to include
"shipwrecks, aircraft, and other cultural resources."7 8 Although the
United Kingdom did not adopt the 2001 Convention, it nonetheless
stated in its explanation of its vote that "[tihe procedures for the
protection of underwater archaeology adopted in the Annex are those
which are already followed by the United Kingdom with regard to the
designation of wreck sites within [the UK's] territorial sea and internal
waters."79 Australia "provides in the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 for a
protective regime for all wrecks over 75 years old, which excludes the
application of salvage law."80 Norway amended its Law for the
Protection of Cultural Heritage to include protection (and assert state
ownership) of artifacts from shipwrecks after the discovery of the
Akerendam treasure wreck in 1972.81
Tellingly, even the most vociferous critics of the 2001 Convention,
such as Professor David Bederman-who called the draft Convention "a
totally illogical and extreme reaction to the problems presented in
historic shipwreck management and the conservation of the underwater
cultural heritage,"82 recognize the importance of using proper
archaeological techniques in excavating historic wrecks. 83 As a clear
sign of this harmonizing consensus in at least the Western world on the
treatment of UCH, major international treasure-hunting companies,
which are the targets of this convention, take great pains to distance the
characterization of their operations from the "smash and grab"
reputation of their industry forbearers. 84
78. Timothy Runyan, Management of Maritime Cultural Resources: An American
Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 958.
79. Antony Firth, Underwater Cultural Heritage off England: Character and
Significance, in 21 JOINT NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY POL'Y COMM., supra note 71, at 15.
80. Forrest, supra note 50, at 365.
81. See Fredrik Soreide, Maritime Archaeology and Industry, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 1015-16. Soreide also states that
"[m]ost European countries insist that underwater cultural heritage belongs to the state,
with few rewards to the finder." Id. at 1014.
82. Bederman, supra note 7, at 346.
83. See id. at 352-353 (stating that salvors must undertake their task "in accordance
with accepted contemporary archaeological recording standards").
84, See Ole Varmer, New International Law to Protect Underwater Cultural Heritage, 1
A.B.A. SEC. INT'L. L. ART & CULTURAL HERITAGE L. NEWSL. 1 (2008).
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II. UCH MANAGEMENT IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: COMMAND,
CONTROL, AND CASH IN
As the current state of UCH management in the Dominican
Republic illustrates, converging norms are not the only, nor even the
dominant, attribute of the globalized world. The increasing importance
of nonstate actors, which can "avoid political regulation and substitute
themselves as new regulators of behavior" as well as attack "the
monopoly of legitimate governance authority asserted through the
state," has come to characterize the globalized present political reality
even more than the emergence of a global consensus on governance.8 5
Moreover, when values converge among developed nations, this can
further incentivize developing economies to deviate from the norm to
create economic leveraging power. These dual pressures have played out
in a particularly interesting way in the Dominican Republic, resulting
in a complete misalignment of the country's officially stated goals and
actual practice.
A. A Brief History of Dominican Laws Regulating UCH
From a purely legislative perspective, the Dominican Republic
appears to have a strong, state-centric legal regime protecting its wealth
of UCH that stretches back to the beginning of the last century. Decree
No. 4347 of 1903 declared archaeological objects the property of the
state and forbade their removal from the Dominican Republic.86
Ironically, given the current state of affairs, the statement of purpose
for this decree bemoaned the fact that so many artifacts had already
been taken from the country to "enrich foreign museums."8 7 The
Commission for the Conservation of Monuments, Works, and Pieces of
Historical, Artistic or Archaeological Importance was created in 1932 to
nominate and take measures to protect these sites.88 Per the law, no one
85. See Larry Cata Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State:
The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance
Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 754-56 (2011).
86. Decreto No. 4347 del 15 de diciembre de 1903, que declara propiedad del Estado los
objetos arqueol6gicos [Decree Declaring Archaeological Objects to Be the Property of the
State], G.O. No. 1522, del 26 de diciembre de 1903 (Dom. Rep.).
87. Id. (stating "que muchos ejemplares de esos restos preciosos han salido del pais i
aumentar la riqueza de Museos extranjeros") ["that many examples of precious remains
have left the country to increase the richness of foreign Museums"] (author's translation).
88. Ley No. 293 del 13 de febrero de 1932, que crea una comisi6n de Conservaci6n de
Monumentos, obras y piezas de importancia hist6rica, artistica o Arqueol6gica [Law
Creating the Commission for the Conservation of Monuments, Works, and Pieces of
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could do anything to affect these sites without the permission of the
commission, and no one could transport out of the country any of the
nominated artifacts without the permission of Congress.89 The
Dominican Archaeological Commission was created the following year,
yet only given advisory powers. 90 The next significant law relating to
archaeology was passed as part of the sweeping Law No. 318 on the
Cultural Heritage of the Nation during the repressive "Twelve Years" of
President Joaquin Balaguer's autocratic rule.9' This law opened the
door to the command, control, and cash in model in operation today.
Law No. 318 forced owners of valuable cultural property (including
artifacts) to declare them to the state; prohibited the removal of this
property (even when it was private property) from the country except for
limited exhibition and with governmental consent; and prohibited
archaeological excavations (including in submerged sites) except with
the permission of the State Secretariat for Education, Fine Art and
Worship. 92 However, this same secretariat could allow foreign "scientific
bodies or institutions" and other qualified persons to excavate.9 3
Balaguer created the Office of Cultural Patrimony and gave it power
over archaeological excavations (and essentially everything else detailed
in the Law No. 318) the following year.94 Control of archaeology in the
Dominican Republic changed hands once again in 1973, when Balaguer
granted complete oversight of archaeological activities (including
removal of artifacts from the country) to the Museum of the Dominican
Man.95
Historical, Artistic or Archaeological Importance], art. 4, G.O. No. 4440, del 20 de febrero
de 1932 (Dom. Rep.).
89. Id. arts. 3-5.
90. Decreto No. 22, del 8 de septiembre de 1938, Creaci6n de la Comisi6n Dominicana
de Arqueologia [Creation of the Dominican Commission of Archaeology], G.O. No. 5219,
del 10 de septiembre de 1933 (Dom. Rep.).
91. See ANA S. Q. LIBERATO, JOAQUIN BALAGUER, MEMORY, AND DIASPORA: THE
LASTING POLITICAL LEGACIES OF AN AMERICAN PROTkG9 114 (2013) (describing the
opposition party's denunciation of the "repression that plagued the Twelve Years" of
Balaguer's authoritarian rule).
92. See Ley No. 318, sobre el Patrimonio Cultural de la Naci6n [Law on the Cultural
Patrimony of the Nation], arts. 8, 10, 12, G.O. No. 9086, del 19 de junio de 1968 (Dom.
Rep.).
93. Id. art. 12 ("[L]a Secretaria ... podrAn. . . autorizar dichas excavaciones ... a los
organismos e instituciones nacionales o extranjera de carActer cientifico, asi como a
personas fisicas calificadas. . . .") ("The Secretariat . . . will be able to . . . [provide]
authoriz[ation] [of] said excavations ... to national and foreign bodies and institutions of a
scientific character, as well as to qualified individuals.") (author's translation).
94. Reglamento No. 4195, sobre la Oficina de Patrimonio Cultural [Regulation on the
Office of Cultural Patrimony], art. 2, G.O. No. 9159, del 15 de octubre de 1969 (Dom. Rep.).
95. Ley No. 564 del 27 de septiembre de 1973, para la Protecci6n y Conservaci6n de los
Objetos Etnol6gicos y Arqueol6gicos Nacionales [Law for the Protection and Conservation
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The Dominican government did not specifically address UCH until
1979, when President Antonio Guzman issued Decree No. 683 to create
an Underwater Archaeological Rescue Commission.96 Balaguer
promulgated the internal rules for this Commission in 1987, including
supervisory authority over archaeological "concessions," 97 the permitting
regime under which treasure hunters still operate. Shortly thereafter
(during the 1990s), treasure hunter Tracy Bowden acquired the rights
to excavate the Nuestra Serrora de la Concepci6n, one of the most
productive wrecks (in terms of the monetary value of its recovered
treasure) to be salvaged in the Dominican Republic.98 President Leonel
Fernandez further consolidated power over UCH with the creation of
the National Office of Underwater Cultural Patrimony (ONPCS, but
recently renamed the General Directorate of Underwater Cultural
Patrimony, or DGPCS) in 1999, which oversees all treasure hunter
permitting and the division of salvaged artifacts, and "replace[s] all
previous authorities responsible for this patrimony."99 The DGPCS's
implementing legislation notably references the ICOMOS Charter and
the Dominican Republic's signing of the 1998 Santo Domingo
Declaration on the protection of the UCH, both precursor agreements to
the 2001 Convention, and prohibits the commercialization of artifacts. 0 0
Yet, despite the decree's language mandating protection of UCH, buried
in Articles five and six of Decree No. 289-99 is the power of the Office of
of National Ethnological and Archaeological Objects], G.O. No. 9315, del 8 de octubre de
1973 (Dom. Rep.).
96. Decreto No. 683, que crea e integra una Comisi6n Encargada del Programa de
Rescate Arqueol6gico Submarino [Decree Creating and Integrating a Commission in
Charge of the Underwater Archaeological Rescue Program], G.O. No. 9497, del 28 de
febrero de 1979 (Dom. Rep.).
97. Decreto No. 310-87 del 17 de junio de 1987, Reglamento Interno de la Comisi6n
Encargada del Programa de Rescate Arqueol6gico Submarino, art. Septimo [Internal
Regulation for the Commission in charge of the Submarine Archaeological Rescue
Program, art. 7] (Dom. Rep.).
98. Bowden was preceded by another American treasure hunter, Burt Webber, who
recovered "a fortune" in 1978, and by New England sailor William Phips in 1687. See
Centuries of Seeking, NAVL GEOGRAPHIC, http://www.nationalgeographic.com/features/98/
silverbank/tl.html#cent (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (outlining the history of treasure
hunting related to the Concepci6n); see also NICHOLAS J. SAUNDERS, THE PEOPLES OF THE
CARIBBEAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL CULTURE 203 (2005)
(estimating that the artifacts recovered from the Concepci6n are worth some $10 million).
99. Margaret Leshikar-Denton, Caribbean Maritime Archaeology, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 643. See Decreto No. 289-99, que
crea la Oficina Nacional de Patrimonio Cultural SubacuAtico [Decree Creating the
National Office of Underwater Cultural Patrimony], art. 3, G.O. No. 10019, del 30 de junio
de 1999 (Doin. Rep.) [hereinafter Decree No. 289-99].
100. Set Decreto No. 289-99, supra note 99, at introduction; see also Leshikar-Denton &
Erreguerena, supra note 4, at 29.
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Underwater Cultural Patrimony to grant third-party concessions to
assist with its mission.10 ' Treasure hunters have been successful in
obtaining contracts for commercial salvage that appear to go well
beyond the intent of this provision to provide the Dominican
government some discretion in working with the private sector. These
contracts instead result in the exploitation of UCH that circumvents the
underlying purpose of the Act. 102
In addition to its domestic legislation, the Dominican government
has also consistently tried to portray itself as a team player on
international cultural protection issues and officially concurs with the
mainstream international consensus on the protection of artifacts. It
adheres to both Hague Conventions for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the UNESCO Convention
on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and it
approved and ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property.103 The Dominican Republic was also
elected to UNESCO's executive board in November 2013.104
Despite these internationalist overtures, the Dominican Republic's
most recent move to exert more control over its UCH came in the form
of the 2007 passage of Act No. 66/07, in which the Dominican Republic
declared itself an archipelagic state, expanded its territorial sea from
six to twelve nautical miles (nm), and proclaimed a twenty-four nm
101. Decreto No. 289-99, supra note 99, at art. 5-6 (stating that the powers of the Office
include the following: "execute its program of study, salvage, conservation, and
enhancement of artifacts through third-party concessions") (author's translation).
102. See id. art. 2(b) (describing that the law intended to ban searches aimed solely at
treasure hunting: "Search, investigation and intervention of this heritage should be
performed only by specialists with scientific objectives and through programs of mutual
cooperation among States, excluding all intervention of a purely pecuniary or commercial
nature.") (author's translation).
103. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/erillal
convention.asp?KO=15391&1anguage=E (last visited Dec. 14, 2013); see also Second
Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague 26 March 1999, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/
erilconvention.asp?KO=15207&language=E (last visited Dec. 14, 2013), States Parties
to the World Heritage Convention, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (last
visited Dec. 14, 2013), and Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris 14 November
1970, UNESCO, http//www.unesco.org/erilla/convention.aspKO-13039&Language-E&order-alpha
(last visited Dec. 14, 2013).
104. See Executive Board: Results of Elections, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/newlen/
general-conference-37th/elections/results-executive-board/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2013).
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contiguous zone and a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).105
Article 16 of the Act specifically addresses UCH, both establishing a
statutory body known as the National Maritime Authority "whose main
function is to oversee the research, conservation, and exploitation of
living and nonliving resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil," and
declaring as a national priority the preparation of "a register of the
living and non-living, renewable and non-renewable resources of the
superjacent waters, seabed and subsoil in the exclusive economic zone,
as well as salvage operations with respect to treasures from ancient
sunken vessels within the exclusive economic zone which constitute part
of the national cultural heritage."10 6 The United States and the United
Kingdom took issue with the Act, questioning whether the Dominican
Republic satisfied the requirements under the LOSC for being an
archipelagic state and noting that "the paragraph following article 14
appears to claim rights to old shipwrecked vessels in its claimed EEZ,
rights which are not accorded to coastal States in Part V of the [LOSC]
Convention."10 7 The U.S. government further responded to Act No. 66/07
with a study that appears to criticize the Dominican Republic's efforts to
assert jurisdiction over the salvage of UCH in the Dominican EEZ,
stating "[t]o the extent that the Dominican Republic is relying on
coastal State jurisdiction to implement this provision [regarding salvage
operations], Article 303.2 [of the LOSC] limits coastal State jurisdiction
over such objects to the seaward limit of the coastal State's 24-nm
contiguous zone."108
Interestingly, the National Maritime Authority established under
Act No. 66/07 includes a representative of the State Secretary for the
Environmental and Natural Resources, but no one from the Ministry of
Culture or Monuments, in stark contrast to the UCH management
regime of previous decades. 109 Since the passage of Law No. 41-00 in
2000, the DGPCS (and therefore jurisdiction over UCH) was placed
105. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 65 Law of the Sea Bulletin, at
18-21 (2007) [hereinafter Bulletin 65]; U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
Act. No. 573 of 1 April 1977: Amending Act. No. 186 of 13 September 1967 on the
Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, Art. 1
(establishing 6 nm territorial sea).
106. Bulletin 65, supra note 105 at 30.
107. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 66 Law of the Sea Bulletin, at
98-99 (2008) [hereinafter Bulletin 66] (includes a joint ddmarche undertaken by the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America
in relation to the law of the DR No. 66-07 of 22 May 2007, Oct. 18, 2007).
108. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INT'L ENVTL. AND SCIENTIFIC
AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 130, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ARCHIPELAGIC AND OTHER
MARITIME CLAIMS AND BOUNDARIES (2014), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/221366.pdf.
109. Bulletin 65, supra note 105 at 31.
224
COMMUNITY-BASED STRATEGY
squarely under the control of the Secretary of State of Culture, so it is
noteworthy that the Dominican government would create a new
oversight body for historic wreck salvage.o10 Although this archipelagic
legislation may signal a shift in how the Dominican government seeks
to assert jurisdiction over its UCH-as a natural as well as a cultural
resource, or as a proxy for claiming other seabed resources or expanded
maritime territory"'-the DGPCS (still under the control of the
Ministry of Culture) continues to be the permit-issuing entity for the
time being.112
Scholar Sophia Kopela argues that the Dominican government's
archipelagic expansion, combined with the Decree No. 289-99 grant of
authority to the DGPCS over all research and excavation taking place in
all maritime zones claimed by the Dominican Republic, is evidence of an
emerging trend in international law for states dissatisfied with the
"inadequacy of [the] provisions for the protection and preservation of
UCH" in the LOSC to take matters into their own hands.113 Although
Kopela is correct that the Dominican government is attempting to
solidify its control of this and other incredibly valuable marine resources
(such as seabed oil and gas) "in line with an emerging practice in
[customary] international law concerning the exercise of jurisdiction
over archaeological and historical objects found on the CS [Continental
Shelf] and in the EEZ,"114 this is not convincing evidence that the
Dominican Republic will soon ratify the 2001 Convention.115 The 2001
Convention provides that it will be implemented consistently with the
LOSC-so the assertion of coastal state jurisdiction under the 2001
Convention is still limited to twenty-four nm. Jurisdiction beyond that
in the EEZ and on the Continental Shelf would be based on the consent
110. Ley No. 41-00, que crea la Secretaria de Estado de Cultura [Law Creating the
Secretary of State for Culture], art. 1, G.O. No. 10050, del 5 de julio del 2000 (Dom. Rep.).
111. China has recently begun enforcing its claims to shipwrecks in the South China
Sea, perhaps as part of an attempt to claim strategic areas "which it says has been part of
its territorial waters for centuries." See Jeremy Page, Chinese Territorial Strife Hits
Archaeology, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304470504579164873258159410.
112. See Divers Find Unexpected Treasures Among Coins in Shipwreck off Dominican
Republic, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/
globalmarine-treasure-idUSnPNFL79114+leO+PRN20130912 ("Divers from Anchor
Research and Salvage (a Global Marine Exploration, Inc. company) working with the
Punta Cana Foundation painstakingly excavated the wreck site under contract with the
Underwater Cultural Heritage division [DGPCS] of the Dominican Minister of Culture.").
113. Sophia Kopela, 2007 Archipelagic Legislation of the Dominican Republic: An
Assessment, 24 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 501, 530 (2009).
114. Id. at 533.
115. See id. at 531 n.130 ("It is expected that the DR will very soon ratify the CPUCH
[2001 UNESCO Convention]").
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or agreement between parties and would therefore not provide a basis
for enforcement against foreign flagged vessels and nationals not
parties to the 2001 Convention. 1 6 Instead, the archipelagic claim and
corresponding expansion of maritime zones should be viewed as a way
to gain or solidify jurisdiction and control over activities directed at
seabed resources (including UCH) that may interfere with or trigger
coastal state jurisdiction over natural resources. While there is no
indication that the Dominican Republic's action involves assertion of
rights of ownership or lack of respect for the foreign sovereign immunity
of other countries-such as Spain, who was the original owner of many
of these wrecks and may still own them if not abandoned-the law does
not seem to be a precursor to signing an agreement (i.e., the 2001
Convention) that would require the Dominican Republic to consult with
other nations that may have an interest, including the wreck's original
owner.117 That being said, Dominican politics are notoriously
unpredictable, and a future Dominican administration could decide that
becoming a State Party to the 2001 Convention would further its
goals.118 Nevertheless, even if the Dominican Republic did accept or
ratify the 2001 Convention, its government (and people) would still face
the same temptation, due to lack of funding and infrastructure, to give
concessions to treasure hunters under the guise of outsourcing
management.
116. 2001 Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. Additionally, the 2001 Convention's
provisions on how parties cooperate to protect UCH on the CS are not an extension of
coastal state jurisdiction over UCH, but rather an agreement between parties on how to
cooperate in the protection of UCH in that area: a coastal state may take the lead on
protecting UCH recognizing that when the flag state of the UCH is determined, it may
take over the lead. See id., art. 10(3)(b).
117. See id., art. 10 ("Where there is a discovery of underwater cultural heritage or it is
intended that activity shall be directed at underwater cultural heritage in a State Party's
exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf, that State Party shall: (a) consult all
other States Parties which have declared an interest under Article 9, paragraph 5, on how
best to protect the underwater cultural heritage[ ]"). However, all nations already have a
duty to protect UCH and cooperate with each other for that purpose under Art 303(1) of
the LOSC, so it may be argued that nations party to the LOSC already have a duty to
consult with the flag state of the vessel as well as owner of cargo and others with an
interest.
118. See AMB Country Risk Report Dominican Republic, A.M. BEST, 1, 4 (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www3.ambest.com/ratings/cr/reports/dominicanrepublic.pdf. My personal experience
with the unpredictability of the Dominican political system is derived from the over two
years I lived and worked there as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer.
226
COMMUNITY-BASED STRATEGY
B. A Critique of Increasing State Ownership of UCH and Funding Its
Management Through the Sale of Artifacts in the Dominican Republic
As evidenced by its suite of laws and international agreements, the
Dominican government appears to be rigidly controlling its UCH and
harmonizing its treatment of cultural property with international
norms. However, the actual excavation and disposition of the artifacts
evidences the denationalizing effects of globalization. Similar to
resource extraction and manufacturing, the increasingly strict
regulations on the exploitation of UCH in the developed world have
pushed treasure hunters to certain areas of the global south that are
both rich in maritime history and host to amenable regimes. 119 A quick
Internet search can provide anyone with a little cash and a desire to
own a piece of history with the opportunity to not only buy artifacts
from Dominican waters, but also to invest in a treasure-hunting
expedition.120 A large portion of the one-quarter division of the artifacts
given by the Dominican government to the treasure-hunting company
Anchor Research & Salvage from the Pewter Wreck, a 450-year-old
Spanish merchant vessel that sank near Punta Cana off the eastern
shore of the Dominican Republic, was sold at auction in the United
Kingdom on November 24, 2013.121 The Dominican government is
clearly allowing foreign treasure hunters to exploit the loopholes in its
protective regime; however, this is more of an attempt to have at least
some control over the disposition of its heritage rather than evidence of
outright avarice. In leasing out segments of its coastline to treasure-
hunting companies, the DGPCS has implemented an unsustainable type
of Individual Transferrable Quota as a last-ditch effort to manage its
UCH.122
119. See generally UNDERWATER AND MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 4 (noting that many countries in the global south have yet to
ratify the 2001 Convention and have not implemented legislation of their own to protect
UCH).
120. See, e.g., Next-Generation Treasure Hunters: Global Marine Exploration, Inc. Seeks




121. See Pewter Recovered by GME to be Auctioned in United Kingdom, GLOBAL MARINE
EXPLORATION (Nov. 12, 2013), http://gmexploration.com/pewter-recovered-by-gme-to-be-
auctioned-in-united-kingdom/; see also Hannah Osborne, Punta Cana Pewter Treasure
from Dominican Republic Wreck for Auction, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Nov. 4,
2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/punta-cana-pewter-wreck-dominican-republic-
shipwreck-519437.
122. See Mairobi Herrera, Una "Mina de Oro" en el Fondo Del Mar, LISTIN DIARIO, (Jan.
9, 2012), http://www.listindiario.com.dolla-republica/2012/1/8/217427/Tesoros-marinos-de-
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The Dominican situation-an official policy of centralized state
power with relative anarchy roiling underneath-demonstrates that
strategies recommending the funding of UCH management in
developing countries through revenue sharing with salvors123 or the sale
of artifacts deemed archaeologically unimportant 24 perpetuate the
problem. Even though treasure hunters are only permitted to excavate
in their respective concessions, the Dominican government is
notoriously either unable or unwilling to regulate on-the-ground
activity, even within officially protected areas.125 Treasure hunters have
even used explosives to recover artifacts in the Dominican Republic's
Silver Banks humpback whale sanctuary, the sister sanctuary to the
U.S. Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary. 2 6 Furthermore,
unfettered state ownership of UCH (as opposed to stewardship, which
would not include the right to sell) can be actively destructive in a
RD-atraen-a-cinco-empresas (Naming the four treasure hunting companies with
excavation concessions in the Dominican Republic: Caribe Salvage S.A. run by legendary
treasure hunter Tracy Bowden, Fundaci6n Punta Cana of Paul Beswick, Anchor Research
& Savalge, S.R.L. of Bobby Prichert, and Deep Blue Marine of Wilfred Blum. Indiana
University is incorrectly listed as having a commercial excavation concession, but does
conduct non-commercial archaeological research under agreement with the DGPCS. (See
Interview with Matthew Maus, Research Coordinator, Indiana University Office of
Underwater Science, in Bloomington, Ind. (Dec. 21, 2013))). Individual Transferrable
Quotas (ITQs) are usually used to manage renewable natural resources such as fish in
areas without clear boundaries: they allow the owner of the ITQ to catch a portion of a
total allowable catch (TAC) each season. The quantity of the ITQs "change proportionately
to changes in the TAC set for a species each season. ITQs are fully tradeable and can be
sold or leased to other persons." See Glossary of Terms, AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MGMT.
AUTH., http://www.afma.gov.au/resource-centre/teachers-and-students/glossary-of-terms/
(last visited Dec. 21, 2013). As shipwrecks are obviously unrenewable, even the best-
managed ITQ system is inherently destructive to the archaeological record.
123. See Vadi, supra note 7, at 899.
124. See Daniel De Narvaez, The UNESCO Convention for Protecting Underwater
Cultural Heritage: A Colombian Perspective, in ODYSSEY PAPERS No. 13, supra note 9, at
26 (endorsing the sale of artifacts "of no cultural or archeological significance" to pay for
UCH management in Colombia).
125. See George Holmes, The Rich, the Powerful and the Endangered: Conservation
Elites, Networks and the Dominican Republic, 42 ANTIPODE 624, 638 (2010) (explaining
that the Dominican Republic has many "paper parks," defined as "protected areas that
exist in law but which have very little protection in reality[.]").
126. See Interview with Charles Beeker, Professor, Indiana University, in Bloomington,
Ind. (Dec. 10, 2013) (on file with author), for Beeker's statement that he confirmed with
employees of the DGPCS that ceramics from the wreck of the Nuestra Seiiora de la
Concepci6n (located in the Silver Banks sanctuary) exhibit fresh breaks from the use of
explosives for artifact recovery. See also Memorandum of Understanding Between the
United States National Ocean Service and the Santuario de los Mamiferos Marinos of the
Dominican Republic to Collaborate on International Protection of the Humpback Whale,




country with pervasive government corruption like the Dominican
Republic. 127 Even if artifacts were sold after only the most exhaustive,
academically rigorous, and environmentally responsible excavation,
there is little chance that the money from that sale would benefit either
the community abutting the waters from where the artifact was taken,
or even the Dominican State as a whole.
This proliferation of the consolidation of state power over UCH
combined with outsourcing to commercial salvors is disastrous for
developing nations, not only because of the irretrievable loss of cultural
and historical data, but also because of the ensuing environmental and
economic destruction. Historic shipwrecks-particularly wrecks in
shallow, warm water-provide excellent substrate for critically
threatened coral reefs.1 28 This is yet another example of how commercial
exploitation of UCH through salvage-based companies is a poor solution
for the Dominican cultural patrimony. Contrary to Vadi's, Bederman's,
and the Odyssey team's assertions, historic shipwrecks are usually not
in environmental marine peril and thus needing "rescue" to protect the
wreck's educational value.129 Shipwrecks stabilize over time, slowly
becoming incorporated into the seabed and covered in a protective layer
of hard material and marine life through a process known as
concretion.130 Excavating shipwrecks almost inevitably causes the
destruction of biological resources and should therefore be undertaken
only when excavation is absolutely necessary to extract knowledge from
or protect the wreck, and only by parties that have the time and
expertise to mitigate these harms.1 31
Furthermore, the loss of environmental resources inevitably causes
the loss of economic resources in the Caribbean context. Underwater
archaeology pioneer Peter Throckmorton warned over a decade ago that
"American treasure hunting is destroying scant resources of desperately
127. See MEACHAM, supra note 16.
128. HANS K. VAN TILBURG, DEPT. OF DEFENSE LEGACY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY SHIPWRECKS IN HAWAIIAN WATERS: AN INVENTORY OF SUBMERGED
NAVAL PROPERTIES 11 (2003) ("Warm clear waters also encourage coral growth, and hard
substrates like shipwreck sites make excellent substrates for colonization. In waters
shallower than 60 feet, coral growth can completely obscure artificial objects.").
129. See Vadi, supra note 7, at 898 (stating erroneously the belief shipwrecks are at risk
of destruction by tides; however, her assertion that human activities pose a great threat to
UCH is unequivocally correct).
130. See INDIANA UNIVERSITY UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY TECHNIQUES TRAINING
BOOKLET, supra note 14, at 21-22 (illustrating how wrecks become stabilized due to
incorporation into the seabed over time); see also id. at 29 (defining concretion as "a
composite crust of marine minerals, corrosion products, sediments, and natural life that
eventually coats the most metal artifacts and some organic items deposited in the sea").
131. See generally supra note 9 (arguing that commercial salvors cannot give this level
of care due to the financial pressures of their economic model).
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poor emerging Caribbean nations."132 Throckmorton stated that with
the decline of agricultural and other resource exports from the
Caribbean, "tourism is rapidly becoming the treasure of the Caribbean,"
and treasure hunting robs these developing countries of that
opportunity.133 Moreover, the sun-and-sand tourism that has long
dominated the Dominican economy, requiring intensive coastal
development and causing tremendous environmental degradation,
cannot guarantee indefinite profit any more than the one-shot sale of an
artifact.134
Treasure-hunting companies are not unresponsive to these
criticisms, and are very aware that they operate in the Dominican
Republic only at the pleasure of the Dominican government. Similar to
alleged greenwashing by various multinational energy companies, some
treasure-hunting companies seem to have been influenced by growing
global concern over cultural heritage and have gone to great lengths to
sanitize their images. Anchor Research & Salvage, the company
permitted to work the Pewter Wreck, has partnered with the Punta
Cana Foundation,135  which-ironically-also funds coral reef
conservation efforts in partnership with the University of Miami.136
Since treasure-hunting companies at least seem to fear the
conservationist leanings of the Dominican government, there is hope
that the Dominican Republic could be open to a different model,
provided that another nonstate (i.e., something the Dominican
government would not have to pay for) actor could fill the treasure
hunter's role in the Dominican UCH management scheme. Clearly, due
to the overwhelming pressure on poorer countries to capitalize on their
resources as expeditiously as possible, another method that allows
132. Throckmorton, supra note 8, at 7.
133. Id. As Throckmorton notes, buying into treasure hunting is not only unethical for
the harm that it does to developing nations, it is also an incredibly stupid investment that
borders on fraud. See id. at 10. For example, Wilfred Blum of Deep Blue Marine, one of the
treasure hunting companies authorized to work in the Dominican Republic as of January
2012, was sanctioned and "unconditionally and permanently prohibited from serving or
acting . . . [in any capacity] for, a registered investment company . . ." for violations of the
Securities and Exchange and Investment Company Acts in November, 2012. Wilfred R.
Blum, Exchange Act Release No. 68258, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-14961 (Nov. 19,
2012) (default order).
134. See Colin Crawford, Protecting Environmentally-Sensitive Areas and Promoting
Tourism in "The Back Patio of the United States:" Thoughts About Shared Responsibilities
in Ecosystem and Biodiversity Protection, 25 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 41, 53-54 (2006-
2007).
135. See Divers Find Unexpected Treasures Among Coins in Shipwreck off Dominican
Republic, supra note 112.
136. See Coral Gardens, PUNTACANA ECOLOGIcAL FOUND., http://www.puntacana.org/
corallindex.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
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developing states to sustainably utilize these resources with little of
their own financial input must be developed.
III. PROFIT WITHOUT PLUNDER? A GLOBALIZED YET COMMUNITY-BASED
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AS A BEACON OF HOPE IN THE SCHOLARSHIP V.
SALVAGE STORM
The ongoing exploitation of UCH in developing countries like the
Dominican Republic that profess their intent to protect it, and the
obvious problems with artifact sale even after the most environmentally
and ethically responsible excavation, illustrate that purely state-centric
approaches are inappropriate to the globalized world in which
developing nations and their resource managers (or exploiters) operate.
The Dominican government officially maintains complete control over
the recovery of UCH, yet this regulatory structure has ultimately led to
unsustainable exploitation rather than the use of the resource for the
benefit of all Dominicans. Furthermore, the Dominican government
cannot suddenly begin to manage its UCH and associated natural
resources in a way that the overarching international consensus for
conservation would deem acceptable, even if it became a party to the
2001 Convention. The funding and technical skills simply do not exist
within the state, nor can preservationists hope for a generation of
professionally trained Dominican archaeologists to appear overnight.
Likewise, the Dominican Republic has already found a way to capitalize
on this resource through a function of globalization: specifically the
ability-even of a state-to look outside of one's own borders for money
and expertise absent at home. The Dominican resource management
agencies are accustomed to foreign, nongovernmental participation in
their activities (if not always happy about it); therefore, attempting to
dismantle the general framework of these public-private and domestic-
foreign relationships would be counterproductive.137 Instead, it is more
efficient to reframe these relationships using Indiana University's
Living Museums in the Sea model as implemented through two other
strategies for resource management in the globalized world: Ostromian
Common-Pool Resource Management Theory and Multilevel
Environmental Governance.
137. See Holmes, supra note 125, at 639 (Although foreign NGOs like the Nature
Conservancy are extremely active in the Dominican Republic, "[t]he Nature Conservancy
faces strong resistance from Dominican NGOs, the state and the media, who are very
strongly opposed to its involvement in protected areas administration. This is based on a
form of anti-US sentiment, part of wider Dominican opposition to US ownership of land:
giving a US NGO a role in running a protected area is seen as a damaging attack on
sovereignty").
231
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:1
A. The Living Museums in the Sea Model
Living Museums in the Sea is a multi-resource, sustainable
management strategy developed by the Indiana University Office of
Underwater Science. Inspired by the U.S. Department of Commerce
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National
Marine Sanctuary program, the Living Museums model protects UCH
and the associated marine life by creating marine protected areas
around the UCH site. 38 Artifacts and their associated biology are
predominately left in situ (when appropriate, thus avoiding the need for
expensive conservation techniques),139 and professional archaeologists
provide interpretive materials and train Dominicans as guides and park
managers.140 These no-take, no-anchor zones can provide a consistent
source of income (as opposed to the one-time gain from an artifact sale,
which usually goes directly to the government and not the community
from which the artifact was taken) from tourism and off-site fishing.141
Indiana University has already established three of these Living
Museums on the south coast of the Dominican Republic without
requiring the Dominican government to significantly alter the way it
delegates management authority in the globalized context.142 Indiana
University or other qualified noncommercial research and conservation
programs assisting communities to implement the LMS model can
replace treasure hunters as the specialist third parties to which the
Dominican government delegates some of its management and
138. See generally Frederick H. Hanselmann & Charles D. Beeker, Establishing Marine
Protected Areas in the Dominican Republic: A Model for Sustainable Preservation, 2008
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROC. FROM SOC'Y FOR HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY CONF. 52-61
(discussing the most effective way of preserving cultural and biological resources).
139. See Michael McCarthy, Museums and Maritime Archaeology, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 1050-51 (stating that although
in situ preservation should be considered as the primary option at any site, and that post-
excavation conservation is "maritime archaeology's greatest hidden cost," artifact recovery
must still be left open as an option when necessary due to threats to the artifact or the
potential for significant scholarly benefit).
140. See Hanselmann & Beeker, supra note 138.
141. Although fishing is not permitted within most marine protected areas, and never
directly on the wreck site due to the danger of damage from fishing equipment, UCH
serves as a fish-aggregating device that increases the population of fish in the general
vicinity. See Brendan Foley, Impact of Fishing on Shipwrecks, WOODS HOLE
OCEANOGRAPHIC INST., http://www.whoi.edulsblliteSite.do?articleld=4965&litesiteid=2740
(last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
142. See CHARLES BEEKER & LAUREN AYRES, LIVING MUSEUMS IN THE SEA:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSERVATION, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1 (2011); see also Herrera, supra note 122 (describing how




monitoring responsibilities for significant UCH. However, ensuring this
shift from private for-profit to private nonprofit management actually
results in a long-term, equitable solution for the treatment of Dominican
UCH requires critically analyzing it within the framework of Elinor
Ostrom's principles for successful commons management.
B. Treating UCH as an Ostromian Common-Pool Resource Using the
LMS Model: Appropriate for the Dominican Context?
UCH often fits the classic Ostromian model of a common-pool
resource (CPR). It is characterized by high subtractability (removing
artifacts from a shipwreck subtracts from the benefits that other users
could gain from the site, from the artifacts as both cultural objects and
substrate for marine life) and difficult exclusion (the inherently
ephemeral and difficult-to-control nature of marine boundaries).14 3 As a
result of decades of empirical field studies, Ostrom found that "no single
type of property regime [open access, group, individual, or government]
works efficiently, fairly, and sustainably in relation to all CPRs[, and]
CPR problems continue to exist in many regulated settings," case in
point: Dominican government owned-and-managed UCH.144 Instead,
Ostrom identified seven principles common to successful, long-enduring
CPR institutions, and an eighth unique to CPRs that are part of larger
systems. 145
Although Ostrom did not apply her factors directly to the challenge
of archaeological resource management, there is precedent for treating
cultural property as a type of CPR. Scholar Yan Zhang recommends
using the Ostromian model to supplement management of terrestrial
cultural resources in response to the shortcomings of privatization, state
intervention, and international intervention.146 Treating a resource as
simultaneously cultural and natural is not completely novel in the
scholarly literature either. Professor Pammela Quinn Saunders
suggested treating the natural resource rights of Maine lobstermen,
which are managed as CPRs, as a form of cultural property to gain
increased domestic and international legal recognition of their fishing
143. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as
a Common-Pool Resource 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 120 (2003) (defining common-pool
resources).
144. Elinor Ostrom et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,
284 SCIENCE 278, 279 (1999).
145. ELINOR OSTRoM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (1990).
146. See Yan Zhang, Institutional Approach of Self-Governance on Cultural Heritage as
Common Pool Resources 17 (Centro Studi Silvia Santagata-Int' Ctr. for Research on the
Econ. of Culture, Inst., and Creativity, Working Paper No. 22, 2010).
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practices as a property right.14 7 Yet, managing shipwrecks as both a
cultural and natural resource is further complicated-particularly in
the Dominican context-by the lack of a tradition of community
management (of UCH) that typically characterizes successful CPR
regimes.148 The development of a CPR management program in the
Dominican context must therefore occur in a bi-directional way. Instead
of external authorities harmonizing with organically created local
property-management regimes to afford them legal protection, the
Dominican model will involve communities appropriating and retooling
foreign CPR-management strategies and the Dominican government
altering, or at least reinterpreting, its national cultural resource
legislation in response.
Applying Ostrom's first seven principles for successful CPR
management to the Dominican natural and social landscape illustrates
the particular advantages and challenges of creating this bi-directional
CPR, and how the LMS model can help resolve these issues. 149 Several
of the principles should be considered together when they are helped
and hindered by the same characteristics of the Dominican context and
the LMS framework. The eighth factor will be addressed in the next
section as a type of Multilevel Environmental Governance. At this point,
it is important to reiterate that Living Museums envisions CPR as a tool
for management rather than ownership of UCH. In accordance with
both existing Dominican legislation and the overwhelming international
consensus, the Dominican government would remain the ultimate
owner of state-owned or abandoned UCH, with Dominican community
members owning and managing access rights to the sites.o50
1. Principle 1: Clearly Defined Boundaries for Both the CPR and
Those Who Have the Right to Use It; and Principle 2: Appropriation
and Provision Rules Are Appropriate to the Local Conditions
Marine protected areas are notoriously difficult to govern, even in
developed countries with well-funded management agencies and strong
financial commitments to marine resource management.151 Recognizing
147. Pammela Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change Off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool
Resources as Cultural Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1324, 1372 (2011).
148. See OSTROM, supra note 145, at 58-61.
149. See id. at 90 (stating all seven design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR
institutions).
150. See Decreto No. 289-99, supra note 99.
151. PETER J.S. JONES, WANFEI QIu & ELIZABETH DE SANTO, UNITED NATIONS ENV'T




the utter impossibility of policing large areas of the ocean, the Living
Museums concept requires resource managers to control only the area
immediately surrounding the shipwreck or other UCH.152 Similar to the
highly successful Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary shipwreck
trail, sites are designated with easily made marker buoys, and site
managers maintain a system of mooring buoys so vessels carrying
divers and snorkelers do not have to throw anchor and damage the
site. 53 Boundaries are, of course, only as good as the number of people
who know about and respect them; therefore, community managers will
have to network with the Dominican government to ensure that these
areas are marked on nautical charts and to assist with compliance and
enforcement.
Developing rules appropriate to the milieu for the use of shipwreck
resources will involve a complicated dance among tour guides,
fishermen, and archaeologists. These three groups of stakeholders are
simultaneously in conflict with, yet dependent on, each other for long-
term success. LMS sites cannot be created without the expertise-both
for excavation and interpretation-of professional archaeologists and
parks specialists to interpret the UCH and give it a sustainable
monetary value as a unique tourist attraction. Archaeologists depend on
tour guides and fishermen to abide by park rules so the sites retain
their archaeological integrity. Tour guides require fishermen to abstain
from fishing directly on the site to prevent harm to tourists from hooks,
lines, and nets. Tour guides also prevent tourists from taking the
marine life, which is one of the primary reasons why tourists dive in the
first place. Archaeologists need tour guides to prevent tourists from
taking artifacts and thereby destroying habitats. Appropriation and
provision (which, in this case means site maintenance) of rights and
duties must be structured to overcome the inevitably high transaction
costs of consensus-building and compliance among different
nationalities and professional classes. This will need to be accomplished
through smaller, profession-specific CPRs to manage tour-boat access to
sites and nearby, off-site fishing.154 Nonresident foreign stakeholders'55
152. See Hanselmann & Beeker, supra note 138.
153. See id.
154. Although fishing rights have long been governed by variants of CPR regimes
outside the Dominican Republic, CPR fisheries management has interestingly been the
most successful in the Dominican context when "external or non-fishing NGOs such as
academics, international bodies, or advocacy groups" provide legitimacy to the CPR regime
rules. Evelyn Pinkerton, Community-Based Management & Co-management, OCEAN
MANAGEMENT RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 7, 2003), http://www.maritimeawards.cal
OMRN/pinkerton.html#stoufflel994; See also Fikret Berkes, Success and Failure in
Marine Coastal Fisheries of Turkey, in MAKING THE COMMONs WORK: THEORY PRACTICE
AND POLICY 161, 161-62 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992) (describing how sea tenure
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(i.e., university programs and other professional noncommercial
archaeological programs), in addition to operating with the permission
of the Dominican government, should also form partner agreements
with the other appropriator groups.
2. Principle 3: Collective Choice: Most Individuals Affected by the
Resource Management Rules Can Participate in Modifying Those
Rules; and Principle 7: External Governmental Authorities Respect
the Rights of Resource Appropriators to Devise Their Own Rules
Although logistically the simplest of the seven factors to implement,
ensuring the rights of participation of Dominican community members
and gaining the permission and recognition from the Dominican
government as the resource managers with the absolutely critical right
to exclude are the most politically challenging. The Dominican
government has a long history of, although effective, relatively
autocratic conservation strategies.156 Furthermore, the increasing
economic reliance on tourism, which the LMS model would help
advance, poses significant distributional justice problems if it continues
to be executed using the traditional, elite-run model. 57 The Dominican
government explicitly stated that tourism development "is the highest
priority of the Dominican State as an adequate measure for the advance
of economic progress in the country,"15 8 and there is no guarantee that
increased tourism will benefit the wider Dominican populace or be any
less environmentally destructive than the current all-inclusive resort
model.159 Yet, the very overreliance of the Dominican economy on
management of Mediterranean fisheries dates back to the ancient Sumerians). Treating
dive shop tourists as a CPR has even gained some attention in the academic literature.
See Lee Cronk & Shannon Steadman, Tourists as a Common-Pool Resource: A Study of
Dive Shops on Utila, Honduras, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
APPROACH 51, 63 (Jeffrey H. Cohen & Norbert Dannhaeuser eds., 2002).
155. I specify "non-resident" because many dive shop owners in the Dominican Republic
who are UCH stakeholders are foreign.
156. See generally Holmes, supra note 125 (discussing conservation as an elite process
in the DR).
157. See Crawford, supra note 134, at 56.
158. Decreto No. 395-98, que declara de utilidad pxblica e interds social la adquisici6n
por el Estado Dominicano de varias porciones de terreno en San Crist6bal, para ser
destinadas a la sede del Instituto de Formaci6n Turistica del Caribe [Decree declaring the
public utility and social interest of the acquisition by the Dominican State of several lots of
land in San Crist6bal, to be used for the headquarters of the Tourism Institute of the
Caribbean], G.O. No. 10004, del 31 de octubre de 1998 (Dom. Rep.) ("Que el desarrollo del
turismo es de alta prioridad para el Estado Dominicano como medio adecuado para
alcanzar el progreso econ6mico del pais.").
159. See Crawford, supra note 134, at 52-53, 57.
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tourism combined with the inherent complexity of managing marine
resources described in Principles 1 and 2 could actually force the
development and adoption of Principles 3 and 7. As the international
tourism market moves away from the traditional sun-and-sand model,
the Dominican government increasingly looks to ecotourism as the
solution.160 While this model threatens to perpetuate the antidemocratic
legacy of the Dominican conservation movement in terrestrial sites, the
inherently chaotic nature of the marine space will require a much more
decentralized, and hopefully more democratic, management structure. 161
3. Principle 4: Accountable Resource Monitors; Principle 5:
Sanctions Are Graduated Depending on Seriousness of Offense; and
Principle 6: Low-Cost and Time-Sensitive Access to Conflict-
Resolution Mechanisms.
As already detailed in Part II, the Dominican Republic is
unfortunately, and deservedly, reputed for its incredibly high level of
corruption. 162 However, the Dominican Republic also has a tradition of
local organization springing up to take the place of dysfunctional or
completely absent governmental action, even for notoriously difficult-to-
manage marine resources.163 These independent, nongovernmental
resource management strategies can also blossom into international
partnerships. In the Samand Bay region, an international NGO (the
Washington, D.C. based Centre for Marine Conservation) implemented
a collaborative coastal management program with no assistance or even
recognition from the Dominican government. 6 4 Unfortunately, this
project has faced difficulties due to the lack of legitimization of local
160. See id. at 60, 79-80.
161. See LIGHT CARRUYO, PRODUCING KNOWLEDGE, PROTECTING FORESTS: RURAL
ENCOUNTERS WITH GENDER, ECOTOURISM, AND INTERNATIONAL AID IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC 13-14, 27-28 (2008) (detailing how the Jos6 Armando Bermidez National Park,
a prime ecotourism destination in the mountainous center of the Dominican Republic, was
created to rescue nature from the peasants).
162. See generally MEACHAM, supra note 16 (evaluating the current state of the rule of
law, corruption, and judicial independence in the Dominican Republic).
163. See generally Brent W. Stoffle et al., Folk Management and Conservation Ethics
Among Small-Scale Fishers of Buen Hombre, Dominican Republic, in FOLK MANAGEMENT
IN THE WORLD'S FISHERIES: LESSONS FOR MODERN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 115, 115-38
(Christopher L. Dyer & James R. McGoodwin eds., 1994) (describing how the community
of Buen Hombre works to preserve the coral reef ecosystem and the local marine life in
order to sustainably support the local community).
164. See Emma L. Tompkins, Development Pressures and Management Considerations
in Small Caribbean Islands' Coastal Zones 15 (Ctr. for Soc. and Econ. Research on the
Global Env't, Working Paper No. 8, 2003), available at http://www.cserge.ac.uk/sites/
default/files/ecm_2003-08.pdf.
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control from the Dominican government, illustrating the importance of
Ostrom's seventh principle.165
Although Ostrom states that enforcement mechanisms must be
internal to the CPR-appropriator group, 66 this principle must be
implemented in a more flexible way given both the multinational
character of UCH appropriators and the different aspects of the
resource that they appropriate. Renewable resource takings disputes
should ideally happen at the community level to reduce transaction
costs and the opportunity for corruption to influence outcomes. The
severity of the penalty could vary based on the relative nonrenewability
of the resource. For example, fishing above one's quota, fishing at the
wrong times, bringing divers to the site out of turn, or bringing too
many divers to a site could result in an inconvenient but relatively
minor sanction, while taking a slow-growing coral or sponge or repeat
offenses could result in more severe penalties such as large fines,
suspensions, and public opprobrium.
However, in a departure from traditional CPR-management theory,
the unauthorized taking of the nonrenewable resource (the artifacts)
must be resolved at the national level, as this type of infraction is often
only discovered when the malfeasor attempts to take the artifact out of
the country.'6 7 Fortunately, there is already a strong international
framework in place to deter the illicit trade in artifacts.16 8 The impetus
is therefore on the Dominican government to declare and enforce all for-
profit removal of artifacts as illegal, thereby subjecting treasure hunting
to the hammers of national customs laws.
C. No Justice, No Sustainability: Fulfilling Ostrom's Eighth Principle
Through Multilevel Environmental Governance
Ostrom's eighth principle of successful CPR institutions states that,
for CPRs that are a part of larger systems, "governance activities [must
be] organized in multiple layers of nested enterprise." 69 Although an
individual shipwreck and the coral growing on it may only cover a few
square meters of the sea floor, its stakeholders range from the local tour
165. See id; see also OSTROM, supra note 145, at 90.
166. See OSTROM, supra note 145, at 95.
167. See, e.g., ICE and CBP return 67 artifacts to the Dominican Republic, U.S. IMMIGR.
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1108/
110818santodomingo.htm.
168. See, e.g., Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 10 I.L.M.
289, 823 U.N.T.S. 232.
169. See OSTROM, supra note 145, at 90.
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guide bringing his clients to the dive site to the fisherman working
miles away whose catch spawned on the wreck, all the way to the upper
echelons of the Dominican Ministries of Culture and Environment and
the multitude of foreign tourists, would-be treasure hunters, scholars,
and concerned governments. As Ostrom stated, "[e]stablishing rules at
one level, without rules at the other levels, will produce an incomplete
system that may not endure over the long run."7 0
Scholar Tun Myint echoed this concern in his study of
multinational, polycentric river system governance, stating that to
ensure successful implementation of local, national, and transnational
(i.e., multilevel) environmental governance, nonstate actors must
"cooperate and comply with transnational legal and policy
arrangements at the local layer. . . ."171 In Myint's view, a critical aspect
of creating successful multilevel governance is identifying "sources of
legitimacy for these nonstate actors . . . to be equal partners in the
transnational layer of governance." 172 Thus, it is not enough to
implement a CPR management strategy. CPR management through
LMS must be thought of as a type of Multilevel Environmental
Governance due to the extreme power inequalities among the multitude
of stakeholders.
As stated in the previous section, enforcement mechanisms are
always internal to the user group in all successful CPR systems. 78 Yet,
as the user groups in the Dominican context become more
internationalized due to the influx of tourism development and dollars,
the resource monitors and users risk becoming less accountable to one
another. The LMS model, as it inherently relies on tourism as an
incentive mechanism to protect UCH, must, ensure that it is not
complicit in the continued disenfranchisement of Dominicans from their
natural resource access rights.174
The LMS model as a tool of Multilevel Environmental Governance
(MLEG) has the potential to provide this source of legitimacy for
Dominican nonstate actors so they can hold their own against
governmental and foreign private entities. MLEG, defined as "nested
levels of jurisdictions or the organisation of governance functions at
170. Id. at 102.
171. TUN MYINT, GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: POLYCENTRIC POITICS IN THE
MEKONG AND THE RHINE 39 (2012).
172. Id.
173. See OSTROM, supra note 145, at 95.
174. See generally Crawford, supra note 134 (examining the role of the U.S. in
strengthening Dominican environmental protection).
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several spatial scales simultaneously," 175 helps overcome collective
action problems in large, multi-layered systems by keeping the primary
actor groups at each level small. For example, one Dominican fisherman
who does not want a shipwreck that is his primary fishing ground to be
looted has no chance going up against wealthy United States-based
companies and their allies in the Dominican government, nor even his
fellow fishermen if they see they can make a short-term profit by selling
the location of the wreck to a treasure hunter. But, if he is part of a
formalized local group that governs an aspect of the resource through
Ostromian CPR with the recognition of the Dominican government, he
can gain the legitimacy to participate in the global decision making.
Fortunately, the Dominican legislation governing UCH already
recognizes third-party managers through the same concession rights
that currently allow treasure hunters to plunder Dominican waters.176
Therefore, it should not require significant legislative reform to
substitute one manager (community members and their international
partners) for another.
CONCLUSION
Unless a transnational, globalization-appropriate solution like the
Living Museums in the Sea is proven to be a successful CPR
management model, the Dominican model of "Command, Control, and
Cash In" will increasingly appeal to lesser-developed countries as
cultural protection laws harmonize in the "developed" world. Yet, in this
era of austerity, we can expect all governments-both of developed and
developing countries-to increase the horizontal outsourcing of their
responsibilities to nonstate actors, not always for the public benefit.
Community-based management of our underwater heritage is
consequently imperative for the sustainable use of UCH for all
mankind.
175. Jouni Paavola, Explaining Multi-Level Environmental Governance 5 (Sustainability
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.see.leeds.ac.uk/fileadmin/Documents/research/srilworkingpapers/SRIPs-10_01.pdf.
176. See Decreto No. 289-99, supra note 99, Art. 5 ("execute its program of study,
salvage, conservation, and enhancement of artifacts through third-party concessions")
(author's translation).
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